EXISTENTIAL AND NON-FACTIVE PRESUPPOSITION IN CANDY ADVERTISEMENTS, A PRAGMATICS STUDY

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Abstract
This research describes about presupposition in candy advertisements. It is a descriptive-qualitative research. Descriptive study in textual analysis is applied in this study to analyze the presupposition of the utterances produced by slogan in candy advertisements. The purpose of The study is to identify the type of presuppositions in candy advertisements and the phenomena that are appeared in the advertisement in presupposition as one part of pragmatics study. The result of the study showed that there are two types of Presupposition appeared from all of the data. The first type is Existential presupposition and the second type is Non-Factive Presupposition. This research also showed that there are four brands for the Existential Presupposition and one brand for the Non-Factive Presupposition.

Keywords: Pragmatics, presupposition, existential presupposition

Literature Review
Pragmatics is one of linguistics branches that focuses on how the speaker meaning. The authors choose this subject as the theory related in this research. Pragmatics is also the study of how speaker’s assumption.

As regards the ubiquity of presuppositions, at least the following lexical classes and constructions are widely agreed to be presupposition triggers:

a. factives (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1970)
   Berlusconi knows that he is signing the end of Berlusconism.
   → Berlusconi is signing the end of Berlusconism.

b. aspectual verbs (“stop, continue”) (Simons, 2001; Abusch, 2002; Lorenz, 1992)
   China has stopped stockpiling metals.
   → China used to stockpile metals.

c. temporal clauses headed by “before”, “after”, “since”, etc. (Beaver and Condoravdi, 2003; Heinämäki, 1974)
   The dude released this video before he went on a killing spree.
   → The dude went on a killing spree.

d. manner adverbs (Abbott, 2000)
   Jamie ducked quickly behind the wall.
   → Jamie ducked behind the wall.

e. sortally restricted predicates of various categories (e.g., “bachelor”) (Thomason, 1972)
   Julius is bachelor.
   → Julius is an adult male.

f. cleft sentences (Delin, 1995; Prince, 1986)
   It was Jesus who set me free.
   → Somebody set me free.
g. *quantifiers* (Roberts, 1995; Gawron, 1995; Abusch and Rooth, 2000; Cooper, 1983)
   I have written to every headmaster in Rochdale.
   → There are headmasters in Rochdale.

h. *definite descriptions* (*strawson:ref, etc.*)
   The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago stood up and wagged his finger.
   → Trinidad and Tobago have a (unique) prime minister.

i. *names* (van der Sandt, 1992)
   The author is Julius Seidensticker.
   → Julius Seidensticker exists.

j. *intonation* (*e.g., focus, contrast*) (Jackendoff, 1972; Geurts and van der Sandt, 2004; Roberts, 1998)
   HE set me free.
   → Somebody set me free.

**Pragmatic Presupposition**

Probably the most significant philosophical counterpoint to the Frege-Strawson approach to presupposition, other than the original non-presuppositional work of Russell, is due to Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974), and later clarified in Stalnaker (1998). Stalnaker suggests that a pragmatic notion of presupposition is needed, so that the proper object of philosophical study is not what words or sentences presuppose, but what people presuppose when they are speaking. A pragmatic presupposition associated with a sentence is a condition that a speaker would normally expect to hold in the common ground between discourse participants when that sentence is uttered.

One consequence of Stalnaker's view is that, *contra* semantic accounts of presupposition, presupposition failure need not produce a semantic catastrophe. There are, however, two weaker types of failure that can occur: (i) a speaker uttering some sentence S can fail to assume that some proposition P is in the common ground, even though most utterances of S would be accompanied by the presupposition that P; and (ii) a speaker can presuppose something that is not in the common ground. The former idea was used by Stalnaker to account for some tricky examples of Karttunen (1971b), involving a subclass of factive verbs that Karttunen referred to as “semifactives”. The naturally occurring examples in (14a) and (14b), which involve the (semi-)factive verb “know”, illustrate the point. The first sentence of (14a) involves a past tense, third person use of “know”, and in this case it does seem to be presupposed (at least in the fictional context of the story) that Luke was alive.

(14a) I don't know that Mullah Omar is alive. I don't know if he's dead either. (General Dan McNeill, Reuters, 19 May 2008)

(14b) Vader didn't know that Luke was alive, so he had no intentions of converting Luke to the Sith. (Web example)

Examples like (14) led Karttunen to propose that “know” only triggers a presupposition in some person and tense forms; whence the term “semifactive”. But, as Karttunen himself realized, such a stipulation is unmotivated. What Stalnaker noticed was that in the context of his pragmatic account of presupposition, these examples are not problematic. In the pragmatic account, the verb “know” need not presuppose that its complement is true. When an addressee hears the first sentence of (14a), he will realize that if it were in the common ground that Mullah Omar was alive, then the speaker would know this, and so the speaker's claim would be false. Therefore the hearer can reason that the speaker is not presupposing the complement of “know” to be true. On the other hand, when a hearer is confronted by (14b), it is consistent to assume that Luke was alive. Since speakers using “know” typically presuppose the truth of the complement, we can assume that this is the case here.

Stalnaker's work was part of an avalanche of pragmatic attacks on the semantic conception of presupposition. However, unlike Stalnaker's, many of these proposals had no distinctive role for a notion of presupposition. Working in the immediate aftermath of Grice's 1967 William James lectures,[9] many theorists attempted to reduce presupposition to various combinations of entailment and implicature. Thus Atlas (1976; 1977; 1979), Atlas and Levinson (1981), Kempson (1975), Wilson (1975), and Bör and Lycan (1976) all present detailed (and partly independent) arguments that presuppositions should be understood as something akin to conversational implicatures. Generally speaking, the approach is to justify presuppositional inferences using the maxims of relevance and quantity. Thus, for example, Atlas (1976) suggests that an embedding of a definite under a negation will tend to produce a meaning that is ruled out as insufficiently strong to satisfy the maxim of quantity, unless it is strengthened by treating the definite as if it had wide scope and could
act referentially. Contemporary descendants of this pragmatic tradition include Abbott (2000; 2006; 2008), Simons (2001; 2003; 2004; 2006; 2007), and Schlenker (2007; 2008). Both Abbott and Simons are at pains to distinguish between different presupposition triggers, rather than lumping them all together. Thus Simons, for example, makes a case for deriving presuppositional inferences associated with factives and aspectual adverbs using a combination of Stalnakerian and Gricean reasoning, but does not argue for making the same reduction in the case of typically anaphoric triggers like the additive “too”. Schlenker does not make such fine-grained distinctions between presupposition triggers. Instead, he concentrates on deriving projection properties pragmatically, using both standard maxims and at least one rule specific to presuppositions.

There is a contrast among pragmatic approaches to presupposition. Those discussed in the preceding paragraph attempt to derive presuppositional inferences from general conversational principles, thus explaining both the source of presuppositions, and the phenomenon of projection. But Stalnaker made no attempt whatsoever to explain where presuppositions came from, beyond indicating that they are inferential tendencies that might or might not be associated with semantic presuppositions. This emphasis on the projection of presuppositions rather than their source, which holds also of the contemporaneous work by Karttunen (1974; 1973), to which we shall turn shortly, lived on in much of the work influenced by these theories. It is particularly obvious in what we can collectively term cancellation-based theories of presupposition, led by Gazdar (1979a; 1979b), and including Soames (1979; 1982), Mercer (1987; 1992), Gunji (1981), Marcu (1994), Horton (1987), Horton and Hirst (1988), Bridge (1991), and, of particular note, van der Sandt (1982; 1988).

Cancellation accounts can be traced back in spirit to Stalnaker's account of semifactives, discussed above, in which presuppositions are defeated by competing conversational inferences: the general idea is simply to make presuppositions into defaults, and wipe them out whenever they would cause pragmatic embarrassment. Gazdar's account provided a remarkably straightforward formalization of this account, as well as extending to many other projection phenomena, based on a general principle he characterizes as “All the news that fits”. In Gazdar's model, the strategy for a hearer is first to identify sets of entailments, conversational implicatures, and presuppositions, and then to try adding them to the speaker's set of commitments.

According to Yule, Presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance.(1996:25)

Presupposition can be informally defined as an inference or proposition whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a sentence.” ( Huang, 2007:65)

Type of Presupposition

In the analysis of how speakers’ assumptions are typically expressed, presupposition has been associated with the use of a large number of words, phrases and structures. These linguistic forms are considered here as indicators of potential presupposition, which can only become actual presupposition in contexts with speakers.

1. Existential presupposition:
   It is the assumption of the existence of the entities named by the speaker.
   For example, when a speaker says "Tom’s car is new", we can presuppose that Tom exists and that he has a car.

2. Factive presupposition:
   It is the assumption that something is true due to the presence of some verbs such as "know" and "realize" and of phrases involving glad, for example. Thus, when a speaker says that she didn’t realize someone was ill, we can presuppose that someone is ill. Also, when she says "I'm glad it’s over", we can presuppose that it’s over.

3. Lexical presupposition:
   It is the assumption that, in using one word, the speaker can act as if another meaning (word) will be understood.
   For instance:
   Andrew stopped running. (>>He used to run.)
   You are late again. (>> You were late before.)
   In this case, the use of the expressions "stop" and "again" are taken to presuppose another (unstated) concept.

4. Structural presupposition:
   It is the assumption associated with the use of certain words and phrases. For example, wh-questions in English are conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that the information after the wh-form (e.g. when and where) is already known to be the case.
   When did she travel to the USA? ( >> she traveled)
   Where did you buy the book? (>> you bought the book)
   The listener perceives that the information presented is necessarily true rather than just the presupposition of the person asking the question.
5. Non-factive presupposition: It is an assumption that something is not true. For example, verbs like "dream", "imagine" and "pretend" are used with the presupposition that what follows is not true.

I dreamed that I was rich. (>> I am not rich)
We imagined that we were in London. (>> We are not in London)

6. Counterfactual presupposition: It is the assumption that what is presupposed is not only untrue, but is the opposite of what is true, or contrary to facts. For instance, some conditional structures, generally called counterfactual conditionals, presuppose that the information, in the if-clauses, is not true at the time of utterance.

Definition of advertisement according to meriamwebster.dictionary is a public notice; especially: one published in the press or broadcast over the air, or the act or process of advertising something. In dictionary.com, advertisement is a paid announcement, as of goods for sale, in newspapers or magazines, on radio or television, etc. a public notice, especially in print. And the action of making generally known; a calling to the attention of the public.

Smriti chand is his article,"Type of advertising is :1) direct mail, 2) Newspaper and magazines, 3) Radio advertising, 4) television advertising, 5) film advertising, 6) outdoor advertising, 7) window display 8) fairs and exhibition 9) specialy advertising." A slogan is a memorable motto or phrase used in a clan, political, commercial, religious, and other context as a repetitve expression of an idea or purpose, with the goal of persuading members of the public or a more defined target group. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines a slogan as "a short and striking or memorable phrase used in advertising."

Wang (2013), A slogan is part of the production aspect that helps create an image for the product, service or cause it's representing. Slogans are used to convey a message about the product, service or cause that it is representing. It can have a musical tone to it or written as a song. Slogans are often used to capture the attention of the audience it is trying to reach. If the slogan is used for commercial purposes, often it is written to be memorable/catchy in order for a consumer to associate the slogan with the product it is representing.(p.275-27)

Previous Research

Diah, Novita (2013) Presupposition In Goods Advertisement Slogans of The Jakarta Post Skripsi,Fakultas Ilmu Budaya .This thesis is a research about. in which the researcher tried to classify the data based on the types of presupposition and the presuppositional meanings of those advertisement slogans as the objectives of this study. In this study, the researcher used Yule"s framework (1996:27:30) to analyze the data based on the types of presupposition. Purposive sampling was used to select the samples that were fifteen slogans taken from jakarta post.com. From this advertisement, the researcher found that the dominant type of presupposition applied in goods advertisement slogans is existential and the second one is lexical, which consist of five slogans (30%) for existential presupposition and ten slogans (70%) for lexical presupposition. The most dominating function applied in these advertisements was selling function that has proportion about 70% of the whole data. The researcher found that 40% of those advertisement slogans were in phrase forms. The others, for about 60% of them were in sentence forms. From this result, it is concluded that the advertiser preferred to apply existential and lexical presupposition because it was considered as the appropriate type for advertisement slogan.

Existential presupposition shows that the product exists, the advertiser can say the meaning of this slogans . By lexical presupposition, the advertiser can say a lot of meaning in a simple way, because the use of one form with its asserted meaning is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that another meaning is understood. As the characteristic of making slogan that has to be regarded, a slogan should be simple and easy. The researcher did not find counterfactual presupposition applied in these slogans because this type is considered not appropriate for advertisement slogan, in which the given information should be true as well as the truth.

Manurung, Hiskia (2015) Presupposition In Television Cosmetic Advertisements. Postgraduate School Of The State University Of Medan. Masters thesis, UNIMED. It focused on the study of presupposition in the claims of television cosmetic advertisements. The aims of this study is to find out the types of presupposition, to identify the types of information content and the advertisement message appeals employed in the claims of the television cosmetic advertisements and to explain the reason of the use of presupposition in the claims of television cosmetic advertisements.

This research was conducted by using qualitative content analysis method. The objects of the study were 76 adversitementes in five different cosmetic advertisements category aired from January 2014 to December 2014 by using homogenous-purposive sampling method. The data were the utterances in the television cosmetic
advertisements which indicate the claim of the advertised product. The data analyzed by using the theory of presupposition proposed by Yule, Resnik and Stern’s Framework to objectively measure the information content of advertisements and Pollay’s framework for message appeals analysis. The result of the study were; three types of presupposition found in the claims of television cosmetic advertisements: (1) existential presupposition, (2) Lexical presupposition (3) Structural Presupposition. Other types of presupposition did not present in the study. The types of information content found in the claims of television cosmetic advertisements were: Content of the product, Availability of the advertised product, New Ideas and Characteristics of the product.

The study showed that the claims of cosmetic television advertisement were informative. The advertisement message appeals used both rational and emotional appeals in the claims of television cosmetic advertisements. The types of message appeals found were: affiliation, convenience, distinctive, durable, enjoyment, family, natural, safety, technology, and vain. The reasons of presupposition use in the claims of cosmetic advertisements are intended by the advertisers to achieve several ways such as: (1) as a linguistic device for implicit competition (2) Causing the audience to consider the existence of a certain product, (3) Presupposing the audience cultural and social values reflection to attract audience personal interest, and (4) making the advertisements short and memorable in the eyes of the audience mind. The difference between this research and the previous research is the topic and the data that were taken from different area and object.

Research Question
1. In what way Presupposition appeared in candies’ advertisement?
2. What type of Presupposition in candy’s slogan advertisement?

Purpose Of The Study
The purpose of this research are:
1. To describe the appearance of Presupposition in Candy advertisements
2. To explain the type of Presupposition that appeared in candy advertisements.

Methodology
In this research, the writer uses descriptive-qualitative method. It is relevant to the argument of Maxwell (2000), pointing that qualitative data rely on words in description rather than numbers. It is used to describe the appearance of Presupposition and the types of Presupposition because the purpose of the try to describe and to analyze the types of Presupposition that could be found from the data. This research method for this study is descriptive - qualitative. The data were taken from five brands of candy advertisements in TV commercial and internet. Purposive sampling was used to select the samples that were five brands of candy advertisements. Those data were taken from TV commercial and internet. The brands of the candy advertisements are Relaxa, Hexos, Kiss, Blaster and Nanonano.

The Finding of The Study
a. Relaxa
(permen wangi penyegar mulut)
From the data above, the writers assumed that the advertisement has an existential presupposition. Because, the candy is real and exist. The candy has a good smell and taste. It has a pleasant smell and when you ask:
what candy that can freshen your mouth?
The answer is Relaxa.
According to the explanation above, the authors assumed that the candy advertisement Relaxa uses an existential presupposition in the advertisement.

b. Hexos
(dunia bisa berubah dengan kamu angkat bicara, hexos bunyikan suaramu)
The second data showed that this candy makes all the situation will be different by the time the customer consumes this candy. This advertisement also consists of an existential presupposition. The advertisement showed the effect of consuming this candy. The advertisement tried to describe about the situation that will be occurred after consuming the candy.
According to the explanation above, the authors assumed that the candy advertisement Hexos uses an existential presupposition in the advertisement.

c. Kiss
(gak cuma wangi,juga bisa ngomong)
From the third data, the writers found there is a difference type with the previous data. The brand is actually exist and real. However, when we see into the slogan, the authors realized that this slogan is not an existential presupposition. As the matter of fact, all candies in the whole world are not able to speak in any way. Meanwhile, the slogan said that the candy could speak. In author’s opinion, this brand has a non – factive presupposition. As the matter of fact, the author assumed that candy is an inanimate thing.
According to the explanation above, the authors assumed that the candy advertisement *Kiss* uses a non-factive presupposition in the advertisement.

d. **Blaster**
(yang belang emang lebih enak)

The fourth data is Blaster. The appearance of this candy fits perfectly with the slogan. It has striped combination. Therefore, the author assumed that this advertisement has an existential presupposition. The reason why the author assumed it because the candy is real, exist and full of stripes in its shape.

According to the explanation above, the authors assumed that the candy advertisement *Blaster* uses an existential presupposition in the advertisement.

e. **Nano-nano**
(permen nano-nano rame rasanya)

The fifth data is Nanonano. The author assumed that this candy advertisement contains an existential presupposition. It described how the taste of the candy and it is real and exist. Nano-nano has some flavours, such as bitter, sweet, sour, salty and spicy in one package. It is quite different from other candy. The taste is real and exist.

According to the appearance and the taste of this candy, the authors assumed that this candy has an existential Presupposition inside the advertisement.

### Conclusion

The authors found some results in this research. There are three types of Presupposition based on Yule’s theory. Based on five data above, in this research, the authors only found two types of presupposition. The first presupposition is Existential Presupposition. It happened to four brands of Candy advertisements; *Relaxa, Hexos, Blaster* and *Nano–Nano*. Those candy advertisements showed that the advertisement described the real situation and condition that related to the candy. The second type of Presupposition is Non-Factive Presupposition. This research also showed that a Non-Factive Presupposition happened to one brand of candy advertisement; *Kiss*. This candy advertisement showed that *Kiss* is able to speak which is impossible for a candy to speak. Related to the theory above, the authors assumed that this candy advertisement is a non-factive presupposition.

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